In this paper we describe a behavioural biometric approach to authenticate users dynamically based on mouse movements only and using regular mouse devices. Unlike most of the previous approaches in this domain, we focus here on the properties of the curves generated from the consecutive mouse positions during typical mouse movements. Our underlying hypothesis is that these curves have enough discriminative information to recognize users. We conducted an experiment to test and validate our model in which ten participants are involved. A back propagation neural network is used as a classifier. Our experimental results show that behavioural information with discriminating features is revealed during normal mouse usage, which can be employed for user modeling for various reasons, such as information asset protection.
Introduction
We take care to encrypt or password protect our computers so that we can restrict unauthorised access. However, we don't typically consider the situation of 'friendly' unauthorised access to our private personal archives. Consider the people that have access to your physical computing devices and can theoretically access your content. This work addresses this aspect of multimedia content storage and protection by proposing a user authentication method based on mouse movements alone. One could easily imagine the computer immediately locking out a user who accesses the private data of the data owner. It is common to have three security procedures working together to protect information assets and to ensure the controlled access. These procedures are: authentication, authorization and auditing [1] .
We focus here on the first component of security systems, personal identification and authentication, which can be done by something the user knows (e.g., password, PIN code, pattern), something the user has (e.g., card, access token, wrist band) or something the user is or does (e.g., a fingerprint, signature, face, voice, which are known as biometrics) [2] . The need for special hardware devices for data capture is a big limitation of most biometric systems. The advantage of a mouse-based authentication system is that it can be implemented using a regular mouse [2], [3], [4], [5] . User authentication can be achieved statically or dynamically. In the static approach, the system checks the identity of the user once, usually at the beginning of the session so any change of user after that will be unnoticeable to the system. In contrast, dynamic verification checks the user continuously over the session which can effectively prevent session hijacking, however that should be done passively without interrupting the user [6] . In this work, we present a dynamic user authentication based on mouse movements only and using normal mouse devices.
Related Work
Several mouse dynamics approaches for dynamic authentication have been proposed in the literature, presenting different types of features. Hayashi et al. [7] presented one of the earliest research in this domain; users were requested to use the mouse for drawing circles or other figures, and then analytics algorithms were applied on features based on the distances between the mouse coordinates and the centre of the shapes. In [2], Pusara and Brodley used the distance, angle and speed between pairs of data points as raw features which then used to produce their mean, standard deviation and the third moment values (distance, angle and speed) over a window of N data points. In Ahmed and Traore's work [3] , raw mouse events are aggregated and then classified by action type. Consecutive actions are grouped into sessions, from which features related to movement speed, movement direction, traveled distance are computed producing user signature. Schulz in [5] presented a model in which raw data are broken into mouse curves; length, curvature and inflection points of the curve are used as main features, and a reference signature is built by generating histograms from the curve characteristics of multiple curves. The verification is implemented then by computing the Euclidean distance between the reference signature and the mouse activity observed during authentication time. Jorgensen and Yu [8] evaluated the approaches done by [2] and [3] and discussed some of the limitations in their works. According to [8] it is not clear whether the system detects the differences in mouse behavior or differences among the working environment including the performed task.
To overcome the above mentioned drawback of the state-of-the-art methods, our main challenge is to extract features that can reflect the user behavior patterns regardless of both the task that she/he is performing and the environment she/he is working in. Our underlying hypothesis is that mouse curves have such user-specific information that can be used to model users behavior. Our approach is similar to the one followed by Schulz [5] in using histograms of features extracted from the mouse curves. However, the two approaches differ in two major aspects. First, we use different features and emphasise on using ones that satisfy certain mathematical properties related to task-independence. Second, [5] uses a single 'reference' signature per user. The Euclidean distance between the
